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Abstract
Modern cryptography is based on various building blocks such as one way functions with or without trapdoors, pseudo-random
functions, one way permutations with or without trapdoors, etc. In a quantum world some of the main candidates for these building
blocks are broken. For instance, the security of the most popular public-key cryptosystem—RSA—is related to the difﬁculty of
factoring large numbers, and is broken (in principle) by a quantum computer. We investigate some of the remaining candidates, and
discuss the resulting “Post-Quantum Cryptography’’ (namely, the resulting “modern cryptography in a quantum environment’’).
About half a decade agoAjtai andDwork (and later on, alsoGoldreich,Goldwasser andHalevi) proposed a public key cryptosystem
that has a proven security under a plausible complexity assumption. The plausible assumption is that the so-called unique shortest
vector problem (u-SVP) is hard on the worst case. This problem is potentially still hard also in a quantum environment. Recently,
Regev introduced a new (and much simpler) public key cryptosystem, based on the same u-SVP hardness assumption, but with
improved parameters.
In this paperwe present chosen ciphertext attacks (CCA) against all three cryptosystems.Our attack shows that these cryptosystems
are totally insecure against CCA, because the private keys can be recovered in polynomial time. We then discuss the possibility of
making public key encryption (PKE) secure against CCA, without adding stronger assumptions than the assumption that u-SVP is
hard. We conclude that the current understanding of modern cryptography in a quantum environment can only suggest CCA-secure
interactive-PKE, which is obviously weaker than CCA-secure PKE. Finally, we discuss the relation of our attack to the reaction
attack of Hall, Goldberg and Schneier, which we only recently became aware of.
© 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Public key encryption; Quantum environment; Chosen ciphertext attack; Unique shortest vector problem (u-SVP); Post-Quantum
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1. Introduction
The idea of a public key encryption (PKE) was proposed by Difﬁe and Hellman in their pioneering paper [5] in
1976. Their revolutionary idea was to enable secure message exchange between a sender and a receiver without having
the need to meet in advance to agree on a common secret key. Shortly thereafter, Rivest, Shamir and Adleman (RSA)
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proposed the ﬁrst candidate for PKE, the RSA PKE. In general, PKE is one of the most powerful cryptographic
primitives. Actually, many other basic primitives such as private key encryption, digital signature, bit commitment,
oblivious transfer, key distribution, etc. may be derived from the PKE.
Unfortunately, the question of the existence of PKE still remains open. Till now RSA is the most used PKE, but its
security is not proven (even under plausible assumptions). The security of this cryptosystem depends on the difﬁculty of
factoring of large numbers into their prime factors. In 1994 Shor [29] showed that on a quantum computer the problem
of factorization becomes solvable in polynomial time. If one day a large quantum computer is built, RSAwill become
insecure. Furthermore, it may well be possible that factoring is also easy for a regular computer even if P = NP or
P = (NP∩ coNP) is assumed.We assume here a quantum world where PKE based on factoring and discrete logarithm
is broken. Namely, we consider a problem to be “easy’’ if it is solved by a quantum computer, “hard’’ if it is hard
for a quantum computer, and “potentially hard’’ if it is not yet known to be easy for a quantum computer. We call
this world “quantum environment’’. We ask “what kind of modern cryptography remains once quantum computing
becomes a practical tool?’’ More speciﬁcally, in this paper we ask whether there is a useful PKE in Post-Quantum
Cryptography.
The search for PKE based on a different set of assumptions led to several other suggestions [1,4,9,15,16,24]. Some
PKE systems were already broken on regular (classical) computers (for instance, Chor–Rivest’s knapsack PKE [4])
was broken by Vaudenay [30]), and others were recently broken on quantum computers (for instance, the cryptosystem
based on Pell’s equation problem was broken by Hallgren [11]). The best remaining candidates for PKE that rely on
plausible complexity assumptions are those based on lattice problems.
The unique shortest vector problem (u-SVP) is to ﬁnd the shortest nonzero vector in an n-dimensional lattice where
the shortest vector v is unique in the sense that any other vector whose length is at most C‖v‖ is parallel to v. For
C < √2 the hardness of approximating SVP was proven in [17]. Recently, this result was improved by Khot [12]. He
showed that approximating SVP is hard for C < 2
√
log n
. For C = nc it may well be that the u-SVP and approximating
SVP are hard (potentially with any constant c).
In 1996Ajtai andDwork presented a PKE, based on theworst-case hardness of u-SVP[1]. The security of any random
instance of their scheme is based on the assumption that the u-SVP problem with c = 8 is hard on the worst case.
Although this cryptosystem has provable security, under a reasonable complexity assumption, it is rather impractical.
In order to guarantee security, the public key requires many megabytes [19]. Another problem with that scheme is
the non-negligible probability for decryption errors. The u-SVP based PKE of Ajtai–Dwork was later on improved by
Goldreich, Goldwasser and Halevi (GGH) [9]. In contrast to the encryption scheme ofAjtai and Dwork, the scheme of
GGH produces decryption error with only a negligible probability, and requires only that u-SVP with c = 7 is hard.
In 2002 Regev [24] presented a new public key cryptosystem, which is also based on u-SVP. This cryptosystem
consists only of numbers modulo some large number N, and may be implemented efﬁciently. It is based on the more
plausible assumption that u-SVP with c = 1.5 is hard.
In Sections 3 and 4, we describe AD, GGH and Regev’s cryptosystems in detail and we provide chosen ciphertext
attacks (CCA) against all these cryptosystems. We show that all these cryptosystems are dramatically weak when an
attacker has an access to a decryption procedure. For all three cryptosystems the CCA successfully recover the private
key in polynomial time. Thus, although proven secure against limited attacks (if u-SVP is hard), these lattice-based
schemes are totally insecure against CCA, and therefore are problematic for conventional PKE.
In Section 6, we discuss some known ways of making such schemes secure against CCA, but we conclude that
these known ways are not very promising if the environment is quantum. In more detail, we discuss conventional ways
of securing these schemes against CCA, such as non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proofs, trap-door one way
permutations (TD-OWP) and the random oracle model, and we conclude that much stronger complexity assumptions
are added in any such construction; namely, with our current knowledge, the hardness of u-SVPis probably not sufﬁcient
for designing a CCA-secure cryptosystem. As the scientiﬁc community is not yet aware of candidates for NIZK or
TD-OWP, etc. in a quantum environment, it may well be that, in a quantum world, CCA-secure PKE will always be
impossible. It is important to note that these schemes could still be good for more limited forms of PKE, such as
interactive (CCA-secure) PKE, a computationally secure key agreement, and some other important tasks. 1
1 For instance, oblivious transfer and secure multiparty computation.
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Recently we learnt about the existence of another CCA against the GGH modiﬁcation of the Ajtai–Dwork
cryptosystem—the reaction attack of Hall, Goldberg and Schneier (HGS). We compare their attack and ours, and
explain the differences. We then construct a modiﬁed Ajtai–Dwork cryptosystem which seems to be protected against
the HGS attack, and we show that our CCA still breaks it.
2. Notation
• Overlined symbols like u, i , s(k) are used to denote vectors or points (for our purposes vector and point are
equivalent) in n-dimensional space Rn. A vector symbol without overlining denotes vector’s norm, i.e.,  = ‖‖.
We say that a vector x lies on another vector y when vectors x and y are parallel.
• FRC[x] = x (mod 1) denotes the distance between x and the closest integer, so that for any x, |FRC[x]|0.5.
For example FRC[45.8] = −0.2.
• ROUND[x] denotes the integer closest to x. For example ROUND[45.8] = ROUND[46.49] = 46.
We denote the encryption procedure by E(·) and the decryption one by D(·). Sometimes the decryption procedure is
called “decryption oracle’’.
CCA is a kind of attack in which an adversary tries to achieve some secret information by challenging the decryption
oracle. There are two types of chosen ciphertext attack: CCA1 [18] and CCA2 [22]. In CCA1 the adversary is not
allowed to send queries to the decryption oracle after she has been given the challenge ciphertext. Therefore, the
adversary must ﬁnd some information that allows her to decrypt the arbitrary ciphertext. For example, ﬁnding the
secret key is the ultimate CCA1 allowing to decrypt any ciphertext. In CCA2 the adversary is allowed to send queries
to a decryption oracle before as well as after she is given the challenge ciphertext (except that she is not allowed to ask
for the decryption of the challenge ciphertext after she is given it).
3. Attacks on the Ajtai–Dwork and GGH public key encryptions
3.1. Ajtai–Dwork construction
In this section we recall the construction of Ajtai and Dwork [1]. To simplify the exposition we present the scheme
in terms of real numbers with inﬁnite precision as done in [9]. In reality, following [1] one uses approximation, such
as n-bits binary expansions.
• Common parameters. Given security parameter n, we let m = n3, R = 2O(n log n), and r = n−3. We denote by B
(for big) the n-dimensional sphere of radius R, and by S (for small) the n-dimensional sphere of radius r.
• Private key. Given security parameter n, the private key is a uniformly chosen vector in the n-dimensional unit
sphere. We denote this vector by u.
• Public key.
(1) Select a1, . . . , am uniformly from the set of vectors {x ∈ B|〈x, u〉 ∈ Z}, where 〈x, y〉 denotes the inner -product
of the vectors x and y, and Z denotes the set of integers.
(2) For i = 1, . . . , m select i,1, . . . , i,n uniformly in S, and set i = ∑nj=1i,j . (Thus, each of the i’s is a random
variable which is almost “concentrated uniformly’’ among the vectors of length
√
n · r .)
(3) Set vi = ai + i , for i = 1, . . . , m.
(4) Let i0 be the smallest i for which the width of the parallelepiped spanned by vi+1, . . . , vi+n is at least n−2 · R.
For j = 1, . . . , n, let wj = vi0+j , and denote by P(w1, . . . , wn) the parallelepiped spanned by w1, . . . , wn.
The public key consists of the sequence of vectors (v1, . . . , vm) and the integer i0 ∈ {1, . . . , m}.
• Encryption. To encrypt a 0, we uniformly select b1, . . . , bm ∈ {0, 1}m, and reduce the vector v′ = ∑mi=1 bi · vi
modulo the parallelepiped P(w1, . . . , wn). By reducing a vector v′ modulo P, we mean obtaining a vector v in P so
that v′ = v +∑ni=1 ci ·wi , where the ci are all integers. The vector v is the ciphertext which correspond to the bit 0.
To encrypt 1 we uniformly select a vector v in the parallelepiped P. This vector is the ciphertext which correspond
to the bit 1.
• Decryption. Given a ciphertext, c, and the private key u, we compute  = 〈c, u〉. We decrypt the ciphertext as 0 if 
is within 1/n of some integer and decrypt it as 1 otherwise.
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Fig. 1. The space of ciphertexts.
3.2. Geometric intuition
Before we give a formal mathematical description of a CCA, we provide some geometric intuition. From a geometric
perspective the space of the ciphertexts is the n-dimensional space of real numbers (see Fig. 1). This space is “split’’
by parallel (n− 1)-dimensional hyper planes. The distance between neighboring planes is 1. The unit vector u (private
key) is orthogonal to the planes. The point that is placed close (nearer than 1/n) to a plane encodes 0. The point that is
far from any plane encodes 1.
Encoding of 0 is a process of ﬁnding a point placed close to one of the planes. This point must be indistinguishable
from one chosen at random. The points (a1, . . . , am) belong to the planes. The sum of any combination of ai’s is a
point that belongs to one of the planes. The public key is (v1, . . . , vm), where vi = ai + i . Vectors i are random
and short: ai?i , thus any combination of vi’s gives a point close to one of the planes, but indistinguishable from a
random one.
In our chosen CCAwe choose some lines, each deﬁned by a unit vector . If such a line is not parallel to the planes,
it intersects them. By asking the decryption oracle for a decryption of a polynomial number of points along  one can
ﬁnd the angle between u and . By repeating it for several such vectors one can learn the private key u. The attack is
described in the following section.
3.3. Chosen ciphertext attack: key recovery (CCA1)
The result of this attack is a unit vector u, which is the private key, i.e., our attack recovers the private key.
At ﬁrst we describe a procedure, PROJECT, that computes the projection of u onto some unit vector .
Input: Unit vector , decryption oracle D(·).
Output: The absolute value of projection u onto , i.e., |〈, u〉|.
• First, the procedure ﬁnds a vector c laying on the ray  such that D(c) = 0. The probability that for some random
vector c, D(c) = 0 is 2/n. The number 2/n is polynomial in n, thus we may effectively produce c at random.
• Second, the procedure PROJECT computes two ciphertexts s1 and s2 lying on the ray . Both these ciphertexts are
encryptions of 1. Additionally, they have a property that decryption oracle changes its value on the intervals (s1, c)
and (c, s2) exactly once (see Fig. 2). The ciphertexts s1 and s2 may be found by the next formulae:
s1 = min
k10
{
s = 
(
c − 2
k1
n
)
: D(s) = 1
}
,
s2 = min
k20
{
s = 
(
c + 2
k2
n
)
: D(s) = 1
}
, (1)
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Fig. 2. Computing 1 and 2.
where k1, k2 are indices for integers. The search procedure looks over all k1, k2 = 0, 1, 2, . . . in order to ﬁnd the
minimal values satisfying (1). For two vectors D(s1) = D(s2) = 1, and the following two lemmas assure us that
we can perfectly learn the distribution of ciphertext in the interval [s1, s2].
Lemma 3.1. Function D(·) changes its value exactly once on the interval [s1, c], and exactly once on the interval
[c, s2].
Intuition: Let us consider s1 (similarly we could consider s2), and remember that the interval where D(x) = 0 is at
least 2/n, with the vector c in it. We are searching for a point s1 where D = 1, such that there is only one change of
value between s1 and c. The ﬁrst try is at c − 1/n on the ray . For any n4 we are promised that the intervals of
x such that D(x) = 1 is at least as large as the interval of x such that D(x) = 0. Suppose, decryption oracle returns
zero at point deﬁned by k − 1. Then, if D = 0 at point deﬁned by k, doubling the distance cannot take us too far while
skipping a whole area of D = 1.
Proof. For a formal proof see Appendix A.
Lemma 3.2. The vectors s1,2 may be found effectively (in time expected-polynomial in n).
Intuition: Assume that the vector  is not parallel to the hyper plains, so that the interval of D = 0 or D = 1 is
at most exponentially large (and not superexponentially large). Then the search as described after Eq. (1) is done in
polynomial number of steps.
Proof. For a formal proof see Appendix A.
• Using a binary search ﬁnd the two points near c whereD(·) changes its value. We denote these vectors by 1 and 2.
In order for the outcome to be correct to a precision , an order of k + log (1/) steps are required. With  ≈ 2nO(1)
the search is polynomial in n, and the precision in the obtained ’s is exponentially good.
• From the distance between 1 and 2 we ﬁnd the projection of u onto  (see Fig. 3):
|〈, u〉| = 2
n(2 − 1) . (2)
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Fig. 3. Projection ﬁnding.
In order to ﬁnd u we get an orthonormal basis {1, . . . , n}. Using the procedure PROJECT described above,
we compute |〈i , u〉| for each i = 1, . . . , n. Note that we cannot learn the sign of 〈i , u〉 by the procedure above.
The vector u in the basis {1, . . . , n} is
u =
n∑
i=1
pi · i · |〈i , u〉|, (3)
where pi ∈ {−1, 1} is the sign of the projections.
The next step is to learn the pi’s. The overall sign of the u is unimportant, because |FRC(〈c, u〉)| = |FRC(〈c,−u〉)|,
thus it may be assumed that p1 = 1.
The following lemma gives a tool for ﬁnding pi’s, i2.
Lemma 3.3. For any c ∈ {x1 + yi : x, y ∈ R} the following holds:
D(c) =
{
0, FRC(〈c, u1,i〉)1/n,
1 otherwise, (4)
where
u1,i = 1 · |〈1, u〉| + pi · i · |〈i , u〉| (5)
is the projection of u on the two-dimensional subspace spanned by 1 and i .
Intuition: To learn pi we look at the subspace spanned by 1 and i . We guess pi . If the guess is correct then for any
ciphertext c in {x1 + yi : x, y ∈ R} the decryption given by D(·) must be equivalent to the one given by u1,i .
Proof. It is enough to show that 〈c, u〉 = 〈c, u1,i〉.
〈c, u〉 = 〈x1 + yi , u〉 = x〈1, u〉 + y〈i , u〉 = x · |〈1, u〉| + y · pi |〈i , u〉| = 〈c, u1,i〉.
Given an index i, we choose an arbitrary pi , compute u1,i , and, by challenging the decryption oracle with random
vectors from the set {x1 + yi : x, y ∈ R}, decide whether the guess of pi is correct. For any parameter n′, a
polynomial number of calls to the oracle is enough in order to achieve an exponentially good probability of obtaining
the pi’s correctly. 
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3.4. Chosen ciphertext attack: hidden-message decryption (CCA2)
An attacker has a ciphertext c, and wishes to decrypt it, without disclosing c. Decryption procedure in Ajtai–Dwork
cryptosystem has a property that with large probability
D(E(0) + E(0)) = 0, (6)
D(E(1) + E(0)) = 1. (7)
Indeed, the projection of sum of E(0)’s onto u produce a number close to some integer, when FRC(〈E(0) + E(1), u〉) =
FRC(〈E(0), u〉) + FRC(〈E(1), u〉) is a number, which is far from any integer.
The attacker chooses some encryption of 0, adds it to c and asks the decryption oracle to decrypt the sum. The answer
returned by the oracle is the decryption of the ciphertext c.
The CCA2 is much weaker than the CCA1, and furthermore it is much simpler. Yet, it is still worth to show a CCA2
against Ajtai–Dwork since it may be possible to protect this cryptosystem against CCA1 while not against CCA2.
3.5. An attack on the Goldreich–Goldwasser–Halevi cryptosystem
The encryptionmethod in theAjtai–Dwork cryptosystemmay cause decryption errors, thoughwith small probability.
In [9] amodiﬁcation of the encryptionmethodwas introduced so that the legitimate receiver always recovers themessage
sent. In this section we show that the modiﬁed construction is susceptible to a CCA as well.
In the modiﬁed scheme, just like in the original Ajtai–Dwork scheme, encrypting of a 0 results in a ciphertext c such
that 〈c, u〉 is close to an integer. However, we also make sure that encrypting of a 1 results in a ciphertext c such that
〈c, u〉 is far from any integer. The modiﬁed scheme is as follows:
• Common parameters and private key. The common parameters n,m,R, r, B and S, and the private key u, are set in
exactly the same manner as in the original scheme.
• Public key (modiﬁed).
(1) The vectors v1, . . . , vm are chosen exactly the same manner as in the original scheme. Namely, we ﬁrst select
at random the vectors a1, . . . , am ∈ B s.t. 〈ai, u〉 ∈ Z, then choose the “small vectors’’ 1, . . . , m and set
vi = ai + i .
(2) The integer i0 is set just like in the original scheme, as the ﬁrst index for which the width of the parallelepiped
P(vi0+1, . . . , vi0+n) is greater than n−2 · R.
(3) In addition, we pick i1 uniformly at random from all the indices i for which 〈ai, u〉 ∈ 2 · Z + 1. That is, i1 is
selected so that 〈ai, u〉 is an odd integer. We note that such an index exists with probability ≈ 1 − 2−m.
The public key consists of the sequence of vectors (v1, . . . , vm) and the integers i0, i1 ∈ {1, . . . , m}.
• Encryption (modiﬁed). We encrypt a 0 just like in the original scheme, by uniformly selecting b1, . . . , bm ∈ {0, 1}m,
and reducing the vector
∑m
i=1 bi · vi modulo the parallelepiped P(w1, . . . , wn). The difference is in the encryption
of a 1. We do that by uniformly selecting b1, . . . , bm ∈ {0, 1}m and reducing the vector 12vi1 +
∑m
i=1 bi · vi modulo
the parallelepiped P(w1, . . . , wn).
• Decryption (modiﬁed). Given a ciphertext, c, and the private key u, we compute  = 〈c, u〉.We decrypt the ciphertext
as a 0 if  is within 14 of some integer and decrypt it as a 1 otherwise.
In contrast to the encryption scheme of Ajtai and Dwork, the scheme of Goldreich, Goldwasser and Halevi does not
produce decryption error.
The only difference in the decryption procedure between Ajtai–Dwork and Goldreich–Goldwasser–Halevi cryp-
tosystem is the threshold value of FRC(〈c, u〉). In the Ajtai–Dwork scheme this value is 1/n, while in the Goldreich–
Goldwasser–Halevi scheme it is 14 . If an attacker wishes to break the new construction, he may use the CCAdescribed
in Section 3.3. The only difference is in the calculation of s1 and s2. For the Goldreich–Goldwasser–Halevi it is
s1,2 = min
k∈Z+
{
s = 
(
c ± 2
k
4
)
: D(s) = 1
}
. (8)
The formal proof that the private key can be recovered follows the same steps as the proof given for the Ajtai–Dwork
cryptosystem. The only difference in Appendix A. Lemma 3.1, each appearance of n is replaced by 4.
O. Izmerly, T. Mor / Theoretical Computer Science 367 (2006) 308–323 315
4. An attack on Regev’s public key encryption
4.1. Regev’s construction
Regev’s cryptosystem [24] is similar to Ajtai–Dwork’s, but it is deﬁned in a one-dimensional space. Let us consider
a normal distribution Pk,(r) with median k and variance /2, where  ∈ R+:
Pk,(r) = 1√

exp
(
−

(r − k)2
)
. (9)
This probability distribution has its maximum at r = k and goes to zero at inﬁnity. By summing the distributions
Pk,(r) over all integers we obtain a periodic normal distribution that achieves maxima on r ∈ Z. By normalizing this
periodic distribution in the range [0, 1) we obtain the distribution Q(r):
Q(r) =
∞∑
k=−∞
1√

exp
(
−

(r − k)2
)
. (10)
Based on the distribution Q, Regev [24] deﬁnes the “wavy distribution’’ Th,(r), in the range [0, 1), where  ∈ R+
and h ∈ Z+:
Th,(r) = Q(r · hmod 1) =
∞∑
k=−∞
1√

exp
(
−

(rh − k)2
)
. (11)
For h ∈ Z+ (later on in Regev’s paper the distribution is extended so that h can actually be real) the distribution
Th, represents a wavy distribution with h − 1 picks in the range [0, 1) plus two half peaks at the boundaries. Each
peak (up to an exponential tail outside that range) is distributed according to a normal distribution. Regev then shows
that, in the range [0, 1), a random variable distributed according to Th, cannot be efﬁciently distinguished from a
variable distributed uniformly. (More precisely, he proves [24, Theorems 3 and 4.5] that if, for a certain range of h(n)
and (n, g(n)), where g(n) is any function such that 4
√
ng(n)poly(n), there exists a computationally efﬁcient
distinguisher between the uniform distribution U and the wavy distribution Th,, then there exists a solution for g(n)-
u-SVP.) Furthermore, some analysis of the potential hardness of distinguishing between Th, and U against quantum
computers is provided in [24] based on the results of [23].
Regev’s cryptosystem is deﬁned as follows:
• For a security integer parameter n, let N be 28n2 and let m be cmn2 where cm > 8 is any integer constant.
• Private key: Choose a real number h ∈
[√
N, 2
√
N
)
such that FRC(h) < 1/16m at random. Let d denote N/h.
The private key is the number h.
• Public key: Choose  ∈ [4 · (n log n)−2, 8 · (n log n)−2) uniformly at random. Choose m values {z1, . . . , zm} in
[0, 1) distributed according to Th,. For i ∈ 1, . . . , m, let ai denote zi ·N. Let i0 be an index such that ai0 (mod d)
is odd. The public key is (i0, a1, . . . , am).
• Encryption: In order to encrypt a bit b we choose a random subset S of {1, . . . , m}. The encryption (ciphertext),
c (modulo N), is
c =
{∑
i∈S ai, b = 0,∑
i∈S ai +
⌊ai0
2
⌋
, b = 1. (12)
(Regev proves [24, Lemma 5.4] that if there is a polynomial-time algorithm that distinguishes between encryptions
of 0 and 1, then there is a distinguisher between the wavy distribution and the uniform distribution.)
• Decryption: On receiving an integer w ∈ [0, N) we decrypt 0 if |FRC(w/d)| < 14 and 1 otherwise.
In [24, Section 5.1] Regev proves that from observation of the ciphertexts an attacker cannot achieve valuable
information about the encrypted bits. Also he shows that decryption procedure produces errors only with negligible
probability.
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4.2. Chosen ciphertext attack: key recovery (CCA1)
Intuitively, some ciphertext c encodes 0 when it is close enough to a peak of the distribution Th,. The main idea of
the attack is to ﬁnd the exact positions of the peaks. We use the fact that each wave in the distribution is symmetric
about its peak and the points where decryption oracle changes its value (1 and 2) have the same distance from a peak
. If we ﬁnd 1 and 2, we will know .
Using binary search one may ﬁnd the points where the function D(·) changes its value from 0 to 1 or vice versa.
This algorithm needs a point c on which D returns 0, and two points s1 and s2, deﬁned as
s1 = min
k∈Z+
{
s = c − 1
8
√
N · 2k : D(s) = 1
}
,
s2 = min
k∈Z+
{
s = c + 1
8
√
N · 2k : D(s) = 1
}
. (13)
Lemma 4.1. Function D(·) on the intervals [s1, c] and [c, s2] changes its value (from 0 to 1 or vice versa) exactly
once.
Proof. See Appendix A. 
Lemma 4.2. The points s1 and s2 may be found effectively (in a time expected-logarithmic in N).
Proof. In order to ﬁnd s1,2 we sequentially iterate through k = 0, 1, 2, . . . . By deﬁnition, the maximal length of an
area where points have the same decryption is O(N), namely the maximal distance between s1,2 and c is O(N). From
(13), for the ﬁrst value of k where D(s) changes its value holds:
1
8
√
N · 2k = O(N). (14)
The maximal number of iterations is O(log
√
N), thus s1,2 may be found efﬁciently. 
The result of the binary search is two points 1 and 2. From these two values one may calculate the private key d as
d = 2(1 − 2). (15)
4.3. Chosen ciphertext attack: hidden-message decryption (CCA2)
Werecall that theAjtai–Dwork cryptosystem is susceptible to aCCAthat decrypts somehidden ciphertext (seeSection
3.4 for details). Regev’s cryptosystem is susceptible to such attack as well. An attacker chooses some encryption of
0, adds it to a ciphertext and asks the decryption oracle to decrypt the sum. The answer returned by the oracle is the
decryption of the ciphertext (see Eqs. (6) and (7)).
5. Chosen ciphertext attack in the context of provable security
The security ofAjtai–Dwork, GGH and Regev cryptosystems can be proven under the assumption that u-SVP is hard.
In this context, it is important to understand that our CCA does not contradict the potential hardness of u-SVP. Also,
our attack does not contradict the security of trapdoor one-way functions implemented by these cryptosystems. In other
words Ajtai–Dwork, GGH and Regev cryptosystems still represent semantically secure trapdoor one-way functions,
namely, secure against plaintext attacks. Later on, we discuss the possible ways that might make these cryptosystem
secure against CCA (see Section 6).
Let us recall the main theorem in the proof of security of the Ajtai–Dwork and GGH cryptosystems (Regev PKE
security is based on a similar proposition).
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Theorem 5.1 (Ajtai and Dwork [1, Theorem 2.1], Goldreich et al. [9, Theorem 2]). Under assumption u-SVP, it is in-
feasible to distinguish the encryption of 0 from a uniformly distributed point in P = P(w1, . . . , wn), when given
(v1, . . . , vm) and i0 as auxiliary inputs.
The reason for the weakness ofAjtai–Dwork andGGH schemes against a CCAis hidden in Theorem 5.1: the theorem
applies to one who does not know the shortest vector, but does not apply to the owner of the private key. In a CCA the
owner of the private key is performing the decryption for the attacker, helping the attacker to distinguish the encoding
of zero and the encoding of one. Once the attacker can decrypt (with the help of the key owner) then he may obtain
information about the private key.
Design rationale of a public key cryptosystem resistant against CCAmust differ from the one given inAjtai–Dwork.
If the private key secrecy depends on the hardness of some problem, the possibility to decrypt must not lead to
simpliﬁcation of this problem. For example, in the RSA cryptosystem, the secrecy of the private key depends on the
hardness of factorization of large numbers. But, as far as currently known (for classical computers), the problem of
factorization remains hard, even when decryption oracle is given, and CCAdoes not gain information about the private
key.
Decryption and encryption inAjtai–Dwork, GGH and Regev cryptosystems are “asymmetric’’, i.e., these procedures
are different, and the private and secret keys are not interchangeable. From this point of view these cryptosystems differ
from the RSA. RSA’s keys are equivalent:
• encryption: c = E(m) = me (modN),
• decryption: m = D(c) = cd (modN),
where N = p · q is a large number, p and q are primes. The values e and d are the public and private keys, respectively,
and e · d = 1 (mod(N)) ((N) = (p − 1)(q − 1) is the Euler function). RSA’s encryption and decryption are
identical. Intuitively, the symmetry of RSA is a reason of its security against CCA1: it seems that if a CCA1 on RSA
would be possible then due to the symmetry chosen plaintext attack would also exist.
It is well known that RSA is susceptible to a hidden-message decryption via CCA [25]. An attacker who wishes to
ﬁnd the decryption m = cd (modN) of a ciphertext c can choose a random integer s and ask for the decryption of the
innocent-looking message c′ = se · c (modN). From the answer m′ = (c′)d , it is easy to recover the original message,
because m = m′ · s−1 (modN). Therefore, RSA is weak against CCA2.
In the context of CCA, the main difference between the RSA and the Ajtai–Dwork/GGH/Regev cryptosystems is
that in RSA the private key remains secret. An attacker may recover some speciﬁc message, but not the private key. In
theAjtai–Dwork and Regev’s cryptosystems the private key by itself may be recovered by a CCA, so it is weak against
CCA1 and CCA2.
It is interesting to compare the lattice based cryptosystems to Rabin cryptosystem [21]. The Rabin encryption scheme
is the ﬁrst example of a provably secure public-key cryptosystem (compare to Ajtai–Dwork, GGH and Regev PKE’s
that are also provably secure), i.e., the problem faced by a passive adversary of computing square root modulo a
composite N is computationally equivalent to factoring N. The private key in Rabin cryptosystem is two primes p and
q. The value N = p · q is the public key. Encryption procedure computes E(m) = m2 (modN) (this is the same as
encrypting in RSA with e = 2). Decryption may be performed by anyone who knows the private key (p, q), i.e., the
factoring of the N. Similar toAjtai–Dwork, GGH and Regev cryptosystems, Rabin PKE is completely insecure against
CCA1 (and consequently against CCA2). Using several calls to decryption oracle one can easily ﬁnd the factoring of
N. This result is immediately implied by Rabin’s proof of security. Yet Rabin cryptosystem is less interesting than the
u-SVP based cryptosystems, as it is broken by quantum computers.
6. Protection of PKE against CCA in a quantum environment
The main inspiration for our work was to study the potential answers to the following question: “What kind of
modern cryptography remains once quantum computing becomes a practical tool?’’We showed here that the strongest
candidates for PKE in a quantum environment are broken by CCA.We now have to check the potential ways to re-gain
security against these CCAs. Recently there were several attempts to construct techniques that make PKE resistant
against CCA. It was shown [6,14,18,26] how the encryption procedure may guarantee correctness of the ciphertext
(i.e., that the ciphertext has been generated by a legitimate encryption procedure) by a non-interactive zero-knowledge
proof. But, to the best of our knowledge, all known NIZK proofs are based on trapdoor one-way permutation [7] or
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quadratic residue problem [13]. Till now, the only reasonable candidate for a TD-OWP is RSA that is insecure against
quantum computers. The quadratic residue problem is also weak against quantum computer. Furthermore, there is some
evidence that NIZK is impossible unless based on one-way permutations [8].
The possibility to use interactive zero knowledge seems to be less interesting, because interactions turn PKE into
interactive-PKE, which is somewhat similar to key agreement.
Another way to protect a PKE against CCAs is based on the random oracle model [2]. Designing a scheme so that
it is provably secure in the random oracle model is usually a good engineering principle leading to practical schemes
based on pseudo-randomness (see [20]). However, we do not have a way to judge whether a particular construction is
good, and some constructions were broken [3].
7. Related works
Recently we learnt about the existence of the HGS reaction CCA [10] against the GGH variant of the Ajtai–Dwork
cryptosystem. The HGS attack is somewhat similar to ours, yet, the two attacks are quite different. We construct here a
modiﬁcation of the AD-GGH (and Regev’s) cryptosystem, and we explain how it can be easily attacked by our attack.
It seems that the HGS attack cannot be modiﬁed to efﬁciently attack such modiﬁed cryptosystems.
InAD, GGH and Regev’s cryptosystems, there is a region in the ciphertext space where ciphertexts are decrypted as
“0’’ and an adjacent region where ciphertexts are decrypted as “1’’, such regions then appear periodically (namely, “0’’;
“1’’; “0’’;…). The main step in HGS and in our attack is to ﬁnd very precisely the borderline between the “0’’ regions
and the “1’’ regions. This step is signiﬁcantly different between our attack and HGS attack. We ﬁnd the borderline
between two speciﬁc regions, while HGS searches the borderline in different regions, strongly relying on the exact
periodicity of the problem.
The HGS project-ﬁnding step: Let us observe the AD-GGH version 2 in which the regions’ borderline are exactly
at integers plus/minus 14 . Suppose we are given a simpliﬁed oracle Di (x) which computes x · |ui | and returns “0’’
if the results are within 14 of an integer, otherwise “1’’ is returned. Assuming that |ui | = d0.d1d2 . . . dr (in binary
representation) we can determine |ui | using the following algorithm 3 :
Algorithm 7.1 (Determining |ui |).
(1) Let j = 0.
(2) If D(2j−1) = 0 then djdj+1 ∈ {00, 11}. Otherwise djdj+1 ∈ {01, 10}.
(3) Let j = j + 1. If jr goto step 2.
(4) Pick d0 = 0 and choose the remaining dj appropriately.
The value of d may be represented as
d = d0 + 0.12d1 + 0.012d2 + 0.0012d3 + 0.00012d4 + · · · . (16)
The input of the decryption oracle is
d · 2j−1 = c + 0.12dj + 0.012dj+1 + 0.0012dj+2 . . . , (17)
where c is an integer. Suppose the result returned by the decryption oracle is “0’’. It means that one of the following
two cases holds:
0.12dj + 0.012dj+1 + 0.0012dj+2 + · · ·  14 , (18)
0.12dj + 0.012dj+1 + 0.0012dj+2 + · · ·  34 . (19)
2A similar argument applies to Regev’s cryptosystem as well.
3 There is a minor bug in [10]. The decryption oracle is called with 2j+1 instead of 2j−1 (line 2). In this case bits d1 and d2 are ignored and the
algorithm works correctly only for d0.25.
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If the sum is less than 14 then both dj and dj+1 are zeroes. Otherwise if the sum is greater than
3
4 then both dj and
dj+1 are ones. Assuming that the result returned by the oracle is “1’’, we obtain that one of the bits dj , dj+1 is zero
and the other is one (but one of the bits, dj , is already known from the previous iteration of the algorithm).
Comparing with our method, the HGS attack has an advantage when attacking the GGH cryptosystem. Their “pro-
jection ﬁnding’’ procedure is nonadaptive, 4 i.e., all the ciphertexts can be chosen in advance and they do not depend
on one another. The price to be paid though is that the attack strongly relies on the periodicity of the problem, and
simple modiﬁcations could regain security, e.g, by making the attack exponentially inefﬁcient.
For example, one may deﬁne a cryptosystem similar to GGH, but different in the decryption procedure, where some
ciphertext is an encryption of 0 if and only if its projection onto the secret key u is within (− 14 , 15 ) of some integer. For
our attack, the modiﬁcation is totally trivial, because the binary search will still ﬁnd the boundary as easily as before,
while modifying the HGS is much less trivial (although still possible).
Amuchmore interesting example is using a pseudo-random generator to deﬁne the position of the borderline between
encryptions of “0’’ and “1’’. Suppose we are given a (publicly known) pseudo-random function “rand(·)’’, such that
its input is an integer number and the output is within (1/n, 12 − 1/n). For each integer-deﬁned region, the borderline
with its two neighboring (half-integer) regions is now a random (but known) number between 1/n and 12 − 1/n.
The width of the layers with encryptions of “0’’ and “1’’ is fully determined by the pseudo-random function and is
therefore different for each layer, so that the periodic nature of the problem is partially damaged. The decryption oracle
is formally deﬁned as
D(x) =
{
0, FRC[〈x, u〉] < rand(ROUND〈x, u〉),
1 otherwise (20)
with FRC (also deﬁned in our paper), the distance to the closest integer, and ROUND, the closest integer.
The above variant of theAjtai–Dwork cryptosystem 5 makes HGS attack virtually impossible. At the same time our
attack still requires just a trivial modiﬁcation, since the new borderline is publicly known.
8. Discussion
We presented CCA on three lattice-based cryptosystems: Ajtai–Dwork, GGH and Regev’s PKE. The attacks are
based on the fact that these cryptosystems are proven secure in the sense that distinguishing the encryption of 0 from
the encryption of 1 is as hard as some lattice problem.As a result of this security proof, the private key actually becomes
more vulnerable: the attacker can use the key owner’s ability to distinguish encryption of 0 from encryption of 1, as a
tool to attack the private key. We present here explicit attacks on the three cryptosystems, and provide the full details
of the algorithm used for the CCA.
Yet it is important to mention that lattice based cryptosystems (especially the recent one by Regev [24]) are probably
the best Post-Quantum candidates for key agreement protocol, collision free hash functions, oblivious transfer and
secure secret key cryptosystems, with security based on well studied complexity results, including even some analysis
of potential security against quantum computers as well [23].
We leave as an open problem whether the lattice based PKE can be modiﬁed so that they become secure against
CCA. With RSA (and similar ciphers) broken by quantum computers we suspect that there is no good reason to
expect the existence of TD-OWPor NIZK. In other words, with the current understanding of theoretical Post-Quantum
Cryptography, we have some doubt about the existence of a provable secure PKE, secure against CCA. Yet, a better
understanding of random oracle model and zero knowledge proofs or new candidates for TD-OWPmight lead to CCA
security of PKE.
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Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 3.1. Without loss of generality it is enough to show thatD(·) on the interval [c, s2] changes its value
exactly one time. Let us deﬁne
s(k) = 
(
c + 2
k
n
)
, (A.1)
k′ =
⌈
log
(
n · 〈u, 〉−1 ·
(
1
n
− FRC(〈u, c〉)
))⌉
. (A.2)
First, we show that 〈u, s(k′)〉ROUND(〈u, c〉) + 1/n. Without loss of generality we assume here that 〈u, c〉0.
〈u, s(k′)〉 = 〈u, c〉 + 〈u, 2
k′
n
〉〈u, c〉 + 〈u, 〉 · 1
n
· 2log(n·〈u,〉−1·(1/n−FRC(〈u,c〉)))
= 〈u, c〉 − FRC(〈u, c〉) + 1
n
= ROUND(〈u, c〉) + 1
n
. (A.3)
Second, we show that FRC(〈u, c〉)ROUND(〈u, c〉) + 3/n.
〈u, s(k′)〉 = 〈u, c〉 +
〈
u
2k′
n
〉
= 〈u, c〉 + 〈u, 〉1
n
2log(n·〈u,〉−1·(1/n−FRC(〈u,c〉)))
 〈u, c〉 + 〈u, 〉 · 1
n
· 2log(n·〈u,〉−1·(1/n−FRC(〈u,c〉)))+1
= 〈u, c〉 + 〈u, 〉 · 1
n
· 2 · 2log(n·〈u,〉−1·(1/n−FRC(〈u,c〉)))
= 〈u, c〉 + 2
(
1
n
− FRC(〈u, c〉)
)
= ROUND(〈u, c〉) − FRC(〈u, c〉) + 2
n
. (A.4)
By deﬁnition D(c) = 0, hence −1/nFRC(〈u, c〉)1/n.
〈u, s(k′)〉ROUND(〈u, c〉) −
(
−1
n
)
+ 2
n
= ROUND(〈u, c〉) + 3
n
. (A.5)
We obtain that
ROUND(〈u, c〉) + 1
n
〈u, s(k′)〉ROUND(〈u, c〉) + 3
n
. (A.6)
It is clear that D(s(k′)) = 1, and on the interval [c, s2 = s(k′)] the decryption oracle D(·) changes its value exactly
once. 
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Proof of Lemma 3.2. Assume that |〈u, 〉|2−nO(1) . The chance that such condition does not hold is negligible: it is
[Sn−1/Sn]2−nO(1) with Sn being the surface area of n-dimensional ball. In order to ﬁnd s2 we run through all k’s until∣∣∣∣〈, u〉
(
c + 2
k
n
)∣∣∣∣ > 1n. (A.7)
We denote the minimal k, which satisﬁes (A.7) by kmin.
kmin = O
(
log
(
|〈u, 〉|−1
))
= O(nO(1)). (A.8)
In other words kmin may be found by exhaustive search in time polynomial in n. 
Proof of Lemma 4.1. Intuitively, we will show that the search algorithm cannot “jump’’ over a period of D(·) and
always ﬁnds the ﬁrst area where this function changes its value. Without loss of generality it is enough to show that
D(·) on the interval [c, s2] changes its value exactly once. Let us deﬁne
s(x) = c + 18
√
N · 2x, x ∈ R, (A.9)
x′ = log 4d√
N
. (A.10)
At ﬁrst we will show that 14FRC(s(x′)/d)
3
4 .
s(x′) = c + 1
8
√
N · 2log(4d/
√
N)
= c + 1
8
√
N
4d√
N
= c + d
2
. (A.11)
The decryption of c is 0, hence
− 1
4
FRC
( c
d
)
 1
4
. (A.12)
From Eqs. (A.11) and (A.12) it follows that
1
4
FRC
(
s(x′)
d
)
 3
4
.
On the interval [c, c + d/2] the function D(·) cannot change the value more than once (see the encryption procedure).
If D(s(x′)) = 1 then s2 = s(x′). Otherwise, if D(s(x′)) = 0 then
s(x′) − cd/2,
and
ROUND
( c
d
)
− 1
4
 s(x
′)
d
ROUND
( c
d
)
+ 1
4
.
From the deﬁnition of s(x) it follows s(x′ + 1) = 2 · s(x′) − c, hence
ROUND
( c
d
)
+ 1
4
 s(x
′ + 1)
d
ROUND
( c
d
)
+ 3
4
.
Let s2 be s(x′ + 1). On the interval [c, s2] the decryption oracle changes its output exactly once.
Appendix B: Practical results
Both attacks described in Sections 3.3 and 4.2 were implemented in practice. In order to estimate the attacks’
efﬁciency we measure the number of calls to the decryption oracles. The results are outlined in Table B.1. For the
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Table B.1
The number of chosen ciphertexts needed in attack on Ajtai–Dwork’s and Regev’s PKE
n Ajtai–Dwork PKE Regev PKE
100 112 505 197
200 433 576 397
300 971 694 603
400 1 717 341 798
500 2 475 439 996
600 3 846 192 1203
Ajtai–Dwork’s cryptosystem the number of calls to the oracle may be approximated by 15.3 · n1.93, and for Regev’s
cryptosystem by 2log N. In Ajtai–Dwork’s and Regev’s cryptosystems the size of the public key is O(n4). It means
that the complexities of the attacks are less than the effort of the legitimate user.
References
[1] M.Ajtai, C. Dwork,Apublic key cryptosystemwith worth-case/average-case equivalence, in: Proc. 29thAnnu. Symp. onTheory of Computing,
ACM, New York, 1997, pp. 284–293.
[2] M. Bellare, P. Rogaway, Random oracles are practical: a paradigm for designing efﬁcient protocols, in: Proc. 1st ACM Conf. on Computer and
Communications Security, ACM Press, 1993, pp. 62–73.
[3] R. Canneti, O. Goldreich, S. Halevi, The random oracle methodology, revised, in: Proc. 30th Annu. Symp. on Theory of Computing, ACM
Press, 1998, pp. 209–218.
[4] B. Chor, R. Rivest, A knapsack type cryptosystem based on arithmetic in ﬁnite ﬁelds, IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory IT-34 (5) (1988) 901–909.
[5] W. Difﬁe, M. Hellman, New directions in cryptography, IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory IT-22 (6) (1976) 644–654.
[6] D. Dolev, C. Dwork, M. Naor, Non-malleable cryptography, SIAM J. Comput. 30 (2) (2000) 391–437.
[7] U. Feige, D. Lapidot, A. Shamir, Multiple non-interactive zero knowledge proofs based on a single random string, in: Proc. 31st Annu. IEEE
Symp. on the Foundations of Computer Science, Vol. 1, 1990, pp. 308–317.
[8] M. Fischlin, On the impossibility of constructing non-interactive statistically-secret protocols from any trapdoor one-way function, in: CT-RSA
’02: Proc. Cryptographer’s Track at the RSAConf. on Topics in Cryptology, Springer, Berlin, 2002, pp. 79–95.
[9] O. Goldreich, S. Goldwasser, S. Halevi, Eliminating decryption errors in the Ajtai–Dwork cryptosystem, Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
Vol. 1294, 1997, pp. 105–111.
[10] C. Hall, I. Goldberg, B. Schneider, Reaction attacks against several public-key cryptosystems, in: Information and Communication Security
ICICS’99, Vol. 1726, Springer, Berlin, 1999, pp. 2–12.
[11] S. Hallgren, Polynomial-time quantum algorithms for Pell’s equation and the principal ideal problem, in: Proc. 34rd Annu. Symp. on Theory
of Computing, Springer, Berlin, 2002, pp. 260–275.
[12] S. Khot, Hardness of approximating the shortest vector problem in high Lp norms, in: Proc. 44th Symp. on Foundations of Computer
Science—FOCS’03, 2003, pp. 290–297.
[13] J. Kilian, E. Petrank, An efﬁcient non-interactive zero-knowledge proof system for NP with general assumptions, J. Cryptology 11 (1998)
1–27.
[14] Y. Lindell, A simpler construction of CCA2-secure public-key encryption under general assumptions, Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
Vol. 2656, 2003, pp. 241–254.
[15] R. McEliece, A public-key cryptosystem based on algebraic coding theory, JPL Deep Space Network Progress Report 42–44 (1978) 114–116.
[16] R. Merkle, M. Hellman, Hiding information and signatures in trapdoor knapsacks, IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory 24 (1978) 525–530.
[17] D. Micciancio, The shortest vector problem is NP-hard to approximate to within some constant, SIAM J. Comput. 30 (6) (2001) 2008–2035
(preliminary version in FOCS ’98).
[18] M. Naor, M. Yung, Public-key cryptosystems provably secure against chosen ciphertext attacks, in: Proc. 22nd Annu. ACM Symp. on Theory
of Computing, ACM Press, 1990, pp. 427–437.
[19] P. Nguyen, J. Stern, Cryptanalysis of the Ajtai–Dwork cryptosystem, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 1462, 1998, pp. 223–249.
[20] D. Pointcheval, Chosen-ciphertext security for any one-way cryptosystem, in: Public Key Cryptography, ACM Press, 2000, pp. 129–146.
[21] M. Rabin, Digitalized signatures and public-key functions as intractable as factorization, Technical Report 212, MIT Laboratory for Computer
Science, 1979.
[22] C.Rackooff,D. Simon,Non-interactive zero-knowledgeproof of knowledge and chosen ciphertext attack,Advances inCryptologyCRYPTO’91,
Vol. 576, 1991, pp. 433–444.
[23] O. Regev, Quantum computation and lattice problems, in: Proc. 43rd Symp. on Foundations of Computer Science—FOCS’02, 2002,
pp. 520–529.
[24] O. Regev, New lattice based cryptographic construction, in: Proc. 35th Symp. on Theory of Computing—STOC’03, ACM, 2003.
[25] R. Rivest, A. Shamir, L. Adelman, Amethod for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems, MIT/LCS/TM-82, 1977.
O. Izmerly, T. Mor / Theoretical Computer Science 367 (2006) 308–323 323
[26] A. Sahai, Non-malleable non-interactive zero knowledge and adaptive chosen-ciphertext security, in: IEEE Symp. on Foundations of Computer
Science, 1999, pp. 543–553.
[29] P. Shor, Algorithms for quantum computation: discrete log and factoring, in: Foundations of Computer Science, Proc. 35thAnnu. Symp., IEEE
Computer Society Press, 1994, pp. 124–134.
[30] S. Vaudenay, Cryptanalysis of the Chor–Rivest cryptosystem, in: Advances in Cryptology—CRYPTO ’98 Proc., Springer, Berlin, 1998,
pp. 243–256.
